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THE ECONOl\1IC IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR
MICRATION: RECENT ESTIMATES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
by HOWARD F. CHANG *
ABSTRACT

In this essay, I survey the economic theory and the most recent empirical
evidence of the economic impact of international labor migration. Estimates of the
magnitude of the gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing international
migration indicate that even partial liberalization would not only produce
substantial increases in the world's real income but also improve its distribution.
The gains from liberalization would be distributed such that if we examine the
effects on natives in the countries of immigration, on the migrants, and on those left
behind in the countries of emigration, we find that each group would enjoy
significant gains. Furthermore, estimates of the impact of immigration on native
workers in the United States indicate that only the least skilled native workers
suffer adverse effects and that these effects are small. Thus, although the economic
effects of immigration on native workers and distributive justice among natives arc
often advanced as reasons to reduce immigration, these concerns do not provide a
sound justification for our restrictive immigration laws. Instead, the appropriate
response to concerns about the distribution of income among natives is to increase
the progressivity of our tax system. Protectionist immigration policies are not only
likely to be relatively costly as an instrument for redistribution but also perverse
from the standpoint of global justice. Thus, considerations of economic efficiency
and distributive justice both militate in favor of liberalized immigration policies.

I

TRODUCTION

Given the prominent role of claims regarding the economic impact of
immigrant workers in debates over immigration reform, it is important to
understand what economists have to say about the effects of labor migration. In
this essay, I survey the economic theory and the most recent evidence on the
economic impact of labor migration in order to shed light on these policy debates.
Where economists disagree abollt these effects, I seek to explain and to reconcile
divergent estimates 111 the empirical literature on the direction and magnitude of
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these effects.
Recent increases in the internationai migration of workers are one facet of
globalization, whid' economists understand to mean the development of a glnba i
common market, that is, our evolution toward a world economy that is integraleu
across national boundaries. Our progress in this direction has been especially
dramatic in the liberalization of international trade in goods. Economists generally
welcome this development. prescribing free trade as the regime that maximizes
global economic welfare. They recommend liberalized trade as a policy that is
likely to produce gains for each national economy. Economists also recognize that
the same theory that applies to goods also applies to international trade in other
markets. Nations can gain through not only the free movement of goods across
national boundaries but also the free movement of labor across national
boundaries. I
The basic intuition for this result derives from the gains from international
trade in the labor market. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage
countries to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a result of
migration, world output rises. Higher wages in the host country imply that the
marginal product of labor is higher there than in the source country. That is, higher
wages for the same worker impl ies that the worker produces more value in the host
country than in the source country. Labor migration generally leads to net gains in
wealth for the world as a whole, because labor flows to the country where it has the
higher-value usc." For this reason, economic theory raises a presumption in favor
of the free movement of labor. Migration restrictions distort the global labor -~
changed market, prouucing a misallocation of labor among countries, thereby
wasting human resources and creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant
countries. The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger Ihe
distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restrictions, and the larger
the economic gains from liberalizing labor migration. Given the degree of wage
inequality in the world today,' it should be apparent that the gains from liberalized
migration are huge.
In Part I of this essay, I survey the latest estimates of the magnitude of the
gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing international migration. This
literature indicates that even partial liberalization would not only produce
substantial increases in the world's real income but also improve its distribution by
reducing international inequality. Furthermore. the gains from liberalization would
be distributed such that if we examine the effects on natives in the countries of
immigration, on the migrants, and on those left behind in the countries of
emigration, we find that each group would enjoy significant gains.

I. SI:"I:" Howard F. Chang. LiiJaa/i:ed llllllligrmirlll as Free Trade: Ecollolllic 'N"'/i,rc Will r/1I'
0fllilllalllllllligrcllioJl Po/in·. 145 U. P.<\. L. REV. 1147. 114X~S() (IY97).

2. See

P.<\IJl. R. KRUCJIVIAN

POLICY 158~59

& MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: TIIFURY .·\"11

(2d ed. 1991)

3. See MexicaJl DI:"I)(Jrfees Refl0rf Good Trl:"mlll£'JlI. UNITF:I) PRESS INTER: .\TION.-\I.. Apr. ::' I.
1996, ami/ah/e ell LEXIS. Nexis Library, UPI File (repol1ing the results of a SL!n·cy
deported
Mexican immigrants, who received an average of S271; per wed in the United Statcs. comparcd "ilh
S30.XI per weck in Mexico).

0'
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In Part II, I turn to the question of the effects of immigration on the
distribution of income among natives in the United States. In particular, I review
recent estimates of the impact of immigration on the least skilled native workers. I
suggest that under a fair reading of this economic literature, the best evidence
available indicates that the adverse effect of immigration on the least skilled native
workers is small.
In Part III, I conclude with some observations regarding the use of
immigration restlictions to protect native workers from foreign competition. I
argue that although the economic effects of immigration on native workers and
distributive justice among natives are often advanced as reasons to reduce
immigration, these concerns do not provide a sound justification for our restrictive
immigration laws.
Instead, the appropriate response to concerns about the
distribution of income among natives is to increase the progressivity of our tax
system. Protectionist immigration policies are not only likely to be relatively costly
as an instrument for redistribution but also perverse from the standpoint of global
justice. Thus, considerations of economic efficiency and distributive justice both
militate in favor of liberalized immigration policies.

1.

THE GAINS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some economists have attempted to estimate the gains that the world could
enjoy by liberalizing migration. For example, in an early study using data from
1977, Bob Hamilton and John Whalley produce a range of estimates based on
various assumptions about critical parameters, but a1l their estimates suggest that
the potential gains are enormous. 4 Many of their estimates indicate that the
elimjnation of immigration restrictions could more than double the world's real
income, and even their most conservative estimate indicates that the world's real
income would rise by 13%.5 They also find that liberalized migration would reduce
global inequality by raising wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers.1>
In a recent study applying the same assumptions to 1998 data, Jonathon Moses
and Bj0rn Letnes produce similar results, finding that "the estimated efficiency
gains from liberalizing immigration controls have only increased over time" as a
result of the increase in "wage ... inequalities over the past 20 years."7 Even when
they adopt more conservative assumptions, "the estimated gains remam
substantial," ranging from 5.6% to 12.3% of the world's real income. or from $1.97
------------------------- 4. See Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, 1:.jjiciency and Distributional Implicalions of Global
Restrictions on Labour Mobilin·. J4 J. DE\!. ECON. 6J (1984).
5. Sec id. at 70-72. Using a different model and 1990 data, Ana Maria lregui also estimates large
gains from the elimination of immigration restrictions. See Ana Maria Iregui, Efficiency Gainsfrom rhe
Elimillotioll 0.1" Global Restrictiolls all Labour Mobility: An Allalysis Using a Multiregional CGE Model,
in POVERTY, INTER ATIONAL MIGRATIO AND ASYLUM 21 J, 216, 222 (George J. Borjas & Jeff Crisp
eds., 20(4) (producing estimates of the increase in the world's real income that range from 48% to
67'7<.).
6. See Hamilton & Whalley, supm note 4. at 73-74.
7. Jonathon W. Moses & Bjorn LClIlcs. The Economic Costs ro Internorional Lahor Resrrictio/l.l:
Rel'i.liting rhe EII/pirical Discussion. 32 WORLD DE\!. 1609, 16JO, 16J9 (2004).
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trillion to $4.33 trillion per year. 8 Given that even their most conservative
estimates "exceed the combined levels of development assistance and foreign direct
investment to the developing world." they suggest that "international migration
may be one of the most effective means of shrinking the income gap that separates
rich and poor countries."9 Furthermore, their estimates of the benefits of partial
liberalization of migration controls indicate that "a substantial portion of these
gains can be reaped without allowing for full migration," because even small
increases in migration "could produce significant economic gains," large enough to
"dwarf those generated by traditional development policies."lo
The World Bank has recently studied the potential gains from such a limited
increase in international migration. I I The World Bank economists consider the
effects of an increase in migration from "developing" countries to "high-income
countries" sufficient to increase the labor force in the host countries by 3% by the
year 2025. 12 They conclude that this scenario "would generate large increases in
global welfare,"" increasing the world's real income by 0.6%, that is, by $356
billion in 2025. 14 Their estimates "suggest that labor-market restrictions are
imposing a much larger burden on the global economy than are trade restrictions"
and leave "little doubt that easing restrictions on the movement of labor could
provide a significant boost to the global economy."15
Would the effects of immigrant workers in the labor market, however, be in
the economic interest of natives in the countries of immigration? If we examine the

8. ld. at 1616. The estimated gains in what they consider "the most reasonable ... scenario" are
$3.39 trillion per ycar, or 9.6% of the world's real income. ld. at 1615-16. The magnitude of all these
potential gains increased between 1977 and 1998, not only in absolute terms but also relative to the
world's real income. See id. at 1616.
9. ld. at 1620.
10 Id. at 1610, 1616-1S.
11. See WORLD BA K, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REMI'ITANCES AND MIGRATION (2006).

12.ldat25.
13. Id at 26.
14. See id at 31. Other economists have used 1997 data

to study a similar scenario, liberalizing the
movement of workers by enough to increase the labor force in developed countries by 3%. See L. Alan
Winters et a!., Liberalising Temporary Movement oj Natural Persons: An Agenda Jar the Deveiopmeilt
Round, 26 WORLD ECON. 1137, 1143 (1003). Like the World Bank, they estimate that such a scenario
would increase the world's real income by 0.6%, which comes to $156 billion for 1997. See id at 1145:
TERRIE LOUISE WALMSLEY & L. ALAN WINTERS, RELAXING THE RESTRICTIONS ON TIlE TEMPORARY
MOVEMENTS OF ATURAL PERSONS: A SIMULATIO ANALYSIS 3 (Centre for Econ. Pol'y Research
Discussion Paper No. 3719, 2003). The World Bank economists calculate that these gains would
amount to 0.9% of the world's real income if they express the global gains and global income in terms
of purchasing power parity (PPP). See WORLD BA K, supra note II. at 35.
is. WORLD BANK, supra note II. at 41. The limited liberalization of migration analyzed by the
World Bank would produce a gain of $175 billion, whereas tbe elimination of all remaining ban'iers to
international trade in goods would produce a gain of $155 billion, scaling both gains "to the same
reference year, 200 I." Id.; see WALMSLEY & WINTERS, supra note 14, at 29 (concluding that such a
liberalization of labor movement would produce an "increase in world welfare" that "is substantial and
far exceeds the benefits expected from any remaining trade liberalisation"); Winters et aI., .I'llpra note
14, at 114S (concluding that "very serious amounts of welfare are at stake" and that even sLlch a limited
liberalization of the movement of workers would "offer greater gains than the removal of all restrictions
on goods trade").
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impact of immigrants in the labor market, we find that the natives of a host country,
taken together, will gain from the immigration of labor. If> Wages may fall for those
native workers who compete with immigrant labor, but this loss for those workers
is a pure transfer among natives: it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ
labor, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods and services at lower cost. 17
Furthermore, natives gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain surplus in
excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor. IR Thus, natives as a group
enjoy a net gain from employing immigrants. In fact, the World Bank economists
estimate that the high-income countries receiving immigrants in their liberalization
scenario would enjoy an increase of 0.4% in their real income, that is, a gain of
$139 bi Ilion. 19
The economist George Borjas has calculated some rough estimates, using a
variety of assumptions, of the size of the gain enjoyed by natives in the United
States as a result of immigration. 20 Assuming a perfectly inelastic supply of
homogeneous labor, for example, he estimates that the presence of the existing
stock of immigrants in our labor market increases the income of natives by 0.1 %,:>1
which amounts to a gain of $8 billion in 1998. 22 Borjas generates larger estimates
for the immigration surplus when he drops the assumption that labor is
homogeneous and allows workers to have two different levels of skill."' Under
these assumptions, his estimates range from $7 billion up to $21 billion, but he still
characterizes the gain to natives as "a minuscule amount" compared to the total size
of the U.S. economy.:'4 As noted by the National Research Council (NRC),
however, this gain is not only large in absolute terms but also large compared to the
economic effects of most other public policies.:'5 Furthermore, if we think that
these gains are too small, then we can always increase immigration and thereby
---_._.

__

.-------._--_._------

16. See NAT'L RESEARCH COG 'CIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC DEMOGIV\PHIC AND
FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 135-53 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds .. 1997) [hereinafter
NRC].
17. SeeidatI38-39.
18. See id.
19. See WORLD BANK, supra note I I, at 34.
20. See George J. Borjas. The Eco/lomic Benefitsfromlll1l11igration, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 3. 3 Spring
(1995).
21. See id. at 5-7. Both the assumption of perfectly inelastic supply and the assumption that labor is
homogeneous are extreme and conservative. First, a calculation based on an assumption of perfectly
inelastic supply estimates only the benefits on the demand side from lower wages and omits the
corresponding benefits on the supply side. See id. at 6 n.2. Second, the assumption of homogeneous
labor does not allow for the pc'ssibility that immigrant labor and native labor may be different and thus
complementary rather than perfect substitutes. As BOljas nOICS, "immigration policy maximizes the
economic gains to natives by fully exploiling the production complemenlarities between immigrants and
natives," for example, "by admitling immigrants who complement the native workforce." Id. at 14-15.
22. See GEORGE 1. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICA'
ECONOMY 91 (1999).
23. See Borjas, supra nole 20, at J 3, 17-18. These simulations, however, continue to assume that
labor supply is perfectly inelastic and that natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes within each
class of labor. Both of these assumptions arc unrealistic and introduce a downward bia;; in hi;; estimales
of the gains from immigralion.
24. BORJAS. wpm nOle 22. at 99.
25. See NRC, supra note 16, at 68.
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enjoy substantially greater gainsY'
In addition, the immigrants themselves also gain from their own migration.
They obtain higher wages than in their source countries and thereby enjoy far larger
gains per capita than natives in host countries do from their immigration. In the
scenario analyzed by the World Bank, the additional migrants allowed to move
under liberalized immigration policies nearly triple their own real income on
average, enjoying a gain of $162 biJJion, even after subtracting remittances sent
back to those left behind in their countries of originY In this sense, labor migration
represents a form of international trade in which the source country exports labor to
the host country. Like international trade in goods, labor migration allows foreign
suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing both parries to each
transaction to gain from trade.
In theory, migration may make those left behind in the source countries worse
off insofar as they no longer enjoy the gains from trade that they used to enjoy from
employing the workers who have emigrated. Workers left behind may enjoy an
increase in wages as a result of the departure of competing workers, but employers
and their consumers would lose more from the departure of those emigrants than
the workers left behind would gain from their departure. As long as the migrants
allowed to move under the liberalization analyzed by the World Bank send the
same proportion of their income to those left behind in source countries as that sent
by existing migrants, however, the World Bank estimates that with these
remittances, those left behind would enjoy a net increase of 0.9% in their real
income, that is, a gain of $143 billion.2~ Developing countries, including the
migrants allowed to move in this scenario, enjoy an increase of 1.8% in their real
income. 2,) Thus, "the relative gains are much higher for developing-country
households than high-income country households," not only increasing the world's
real income but also reducing international income inequality.JO

II.

DISTRIBUTION AMONG NATlVES IN THE UNITED STATES

Despite the significant gains from international trade in the labor market,
countries often restrict immigration to protect native workers from the
unemployment or the wage reductions that the entry of foreign workers would
- - - - - - - - . __._---

-----_._-------

26. Higher levels of immigration would bring a more than proportionate increase in the immigration
surplus because the marginal benefits of immigration increase with the quantity of immigration: more of
the decline in domestic wages comes at the expense of immigrant workers rather than native workers.
Therefore, a more liberal immigration policy would produce a much larger immigration surplus for
nati Yes. as the estimates produced by the World Bank would suggest.
27. See WORLD BA K, supra note II, at 34 (reporting that migrants would increase their real
income by 199%).
28. See id. at 33-34. For the average migrant from a developing country, these remittances are 17%
of the migrants' labor income. See id. at 33. For helpful discussions of the various benefits that
migrants confer on those left behind, including remittances. see PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, IMMIGRANTS: YOUR
COUNTRY NEEDS THEM 161-97 (2006); Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Polirical
ECOIIOIl1V oj'ElIligratioll (llId IlIlllligration, 83 N.Y.U. 1.. REV. 234, 247-60 (2006)_
29. See WORLD BANK, supra note II, at 3l.
30. Id. at 35.
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supposedly entail. In this sense, immigration barriers, like trade barriers, are
protectionist; they are designed to protect natives from foreign competItIon.
Protectionists often defend these barriers as policies that promote a more equal
distribution of income among natives, pointing to the adverse effects of
immigration on the welfare of the least skilled workers in particular. Contrary to
popular belief, however, these concerns for distributive justice do not provide a
sound justification for our restrictive immigration laws. 31
First, concerns regarding income inequality do not justify any restrictions on
skilled immigration, bec~use skilled immigrants not only increase total wealth for
natives but also promote a more equitable distribution of income among natives. 32
They are likely to have an adverse effect only on competing skilled natives and
increase the real wages of everyone else, including less skilled natives, who enjoy
the benefits of a greater supply of skilled labor. Therefore, the pursuit of a more
equal distribution of income would at most justify concerns regarding unskilled
immigration, which could have an adverse effect on the real wages of unskilled
native workers. 33
Second, studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets have
shown little evidence of any significant effects on native wages or employment,
even for the least skilled native workers. 34 Given the small effects of immigration
on native wages and employment, protectionist policies seem particularly

31. Moses and Lewes estimate that even if migration under "a full liberalization of migration
controls" were large enough to eliminate international wage inequality. it would still decrease wages in
thc developed countries "only. . by 17.6 percent." which "seems to be a relatively small price to pay
for the sort of efficiency g:lins that are generated." Jonathon W. Moses & Bj0rn Letnes, If People Were
Monev: ESlill1alillg lhe Cains {[lid Scope of Free Migralion, in POVERTY. ITER AT/O AL MIGRATION
AND ASYLUM, supra note 5, at 188,201. Using a different model that divides labor into skilled and
unskilled classes, Ana Maria lregui estimates that such a migration scenario would have a much larger
adverse effect on unskilled workers in developed countries. especially in the United States. See lregui.
supra note 5, at 223 (estimating that wages for unskilled workers in the United States would fall by 40%
or 47% under this scenario). As lregui notes, however. the costs of migration would imply less
migration than that needed to eliminate international wage inequality, even if countries were to eliminate
legal baITiers to migration. See id. at 226-27. Less migration, in turn, would imply smaller effects on
wages. Furthermore. both of these models also make two additional assumptions that bias the results in
favor of large adverse effects on native wages in countries of immigration. First, they assume that
immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within each class of labor. Second, they assume that
ca(tal is fixed and immobile. The discussion that follows in this essay elaborates on the important
impact of these assumptions in estimating the effects of immigration.
32. See Howard F. Chang, Imllligralion a/ld llze Workplace: Imllligralio/l Reslriclio/ls as
ElIlplo\'lIle/l1 Discriminillion. 78 Ctll.-KENT L. REV. 291. 308-09 (2003).
33. Furthermore, even if unskilled immigration were to dlive down the wages of unskilled native
workers, unskilled natives could respond to these wage effects by acquiring more skills. This
investment in human capital would decrease the supply of unskilled native workers and increase (he
supply of skilled natives. which would in tUIl1 reduce income inequality among native workers. See
Randall K. Filer, Book Review. 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 578. 579 (2001) (reviewing BORJAS. supra
note 22) (suggesting that "[i]f increased immigration lowered the wages of unskilled native workers,
more natives would invest in human capita!" until the "only effect" of immigration would be "to
increase the number of ski lled nati ves, possibly reducing income inequality").
34. See George J. BOIjas, The Ecollomics of Il11l11igralion. 32 J. ECON. LIT. 1667, 1697-98 (1994);
Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt. The llI1paCI of Immigrams 011 HOSI COllnTrv Wages, Employmenl
and Crowlh, 9 1. ECON. PERSP. 13. at 23. 42 (1995): NRC, sllpra note 16. at 223.
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misguided. David Card's influential study of the effect of the Mariel Cubans on the
Miami labor market, for example, produces fairly typical results for this literature.
Card found that the arrival of 125,000 Cubans in 1980, which increased the supply
of labor in Miami by 7% almost overnight. had virtually no effect on the wages and
employment opportunities for workers in Miami, including unskilled whites and
unskilled blacks. 35
Why do immigrants have so little adverse impact on the wages and
employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for labor expands when
immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant workers not only supply labor, for
example, but also demand goods and services, and this demand will translate into
greater demand for locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can mitigate
the effect of increased supply.
Furthermore, immigrants and natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor
market, and therefore often do not compete for the same jobs. 36 In fact, labor
markets are highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in some
occupations and natives concentrated in othersY Immigrants compete with one
another far more than they compete with natives ..18 Indeed, some immigrant labor
can complement rather than substitute for some native labor, so that an increase in
the supply of immigrant labor will increase the demand for native labor and thus
have positive effects on native wages rather than negative effects. 3Y
To illustrate these points, consider the restaurant business as a simple
example. Suppose restaurants employ both waiters and busboys, and an influx of
immigrant labor expands the supply of busboys. Restaurants prefer to hire natives
as waiters, however, because immigrants often lack the English language skills
needed to perform well as waiters. Thus, immigrants and natives are imperfect
substitutes in this labor market. Waiters may be predominately natives, whereas
busboys in this labor market may be predominately immigrants. The expansion in
the supply of busboys reduces their wages and thus cuts a restaurant's labor costs,
which enables it to charge lower prices while still enjoying an increase in its
profits. Lower prices bring in more business, as consumers are now more inclined
to patronize the restaurant. Furthermore, to the extent that the influx of immigrants
itself adds more consumers to the local market, this influx of consumers may also

35. See David Card, The Impact of the Marie! Boat/ift on the Miami Labor Markel, 43 INDUS. &
LAB. REI.. REV. 245, 256 ([990)
36. See general/v Jean Baldwin Grossman. The Substilllrabi/itv (~f Natives a;1(1 Immigrants in
Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596 (1982).
37. See NRC, supra note 16, at 218 (concluding that the data suggest that "the jobs of immigrant
and native workers are different").
38. Thus, immigration does have a more substantial adverse effect on the wages of other
immigrants, who are much closer substitutes for new immigrants. See id. at 223 ("The one group that
appears to suffer significant negative effects from new immigrants are earlier waves of immigrants,
according to many studies.").
39. Thus, when BOljas asserts that "rhere is no if/llnigrarion surplus i{rhe natil'e wage is not reduced
by immigrarion," he is assuming implicitly that immigrants and natives can only be substitutes in the
labor market. BORJAS, supra note 22, at 96. Once we drop that restrictive assumption and allow natives
and immigrants to be complements in the labor market, then it is possible for natives to gain from
immigration without driving down the wages of native workers.
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expand the demand for meals at local restaurants.
As restaurants expand supply to handle the greater volume of business, they
must hire more waiters. To bid more workers away from alternative employment,
restaurants must increase the wage they pay waiters by an amount sufficient to
ensure that workers now find employment as a waiter to be more attractive than
before. 40 Thus, the increased demand for waiters drives up the income earned by
waiters, who tend to be native workers. Native workers employed as waiters enjoy
a gain from the entry of more busboys because these two sets of workers are
complements in production. Indeed, given the expanded demand for waiters,
perhaps natives previously employed as busboys can now get better employment
with higher income as waiters. That is, natives may gain even from the entry of
immigrant workers that compete with those natives for some jobs, because those
immi§rant workers are complements rather than substitutes for those natives in at
least some lines of employment.
Native workers enjoy still greater gains once capital adjusts to respond to this
influx of immigrant labor. Owners of capital will respond to higher profits in the
restaurant business by investing in more capacity, either expanding existing
restaurants or building new restaurants. This expanded capacity will enable
restaurants to hire still more waiters and busboys, adding to the gains enjoyed by
waiters and reducing the losses for busboys.41 This expansion in the supply of
restaurants, however, will also drive down profits as restaurants compete for
business by bidding prices down. Ultimately, profits return to normal and
competition passes the benefit of lower labor costs fully on to consumers.
Indeed, in a race to take full advantage of these profit opportunities before
they disappear, investors will make every effort to predict accurately where they
will arise in the future. Insofar as investors have anticipated an influx of immigrant
labor, they may have already invested capital in those economic activities expected
to employ these new workers. Thus, to the extent that investors foresee the influx
of immigrant labor, their investments based on this foresight would bring markets
into long-run equilibrium more quicklyY
This type of scenario would play itself out in markets throughout an economy
absorbing an influx of immigrant labor. Conversely, cutting off immigration would

40. Thus, regardless of the effects that the influx of busboys may have on the tips earned by waiters
in this market, the total compensation (wages plus tips) expected by a waiter in this market would rise.
Restaurants must increase the wages they pay to waiters by an amount sufficient to increase their total
expected compensation in order to induce more workers to take jobs as waiters.
41. Thus, by shifting resources to the sectors of the economy employing immigrants, an economy
can mitigate or even eliminate the adverse effects that immigrant workers may have on the wages of
competing native workers. See Noel Gatson & Douglas Nelson, llIll1ligrmion and Labour-Markel
OlilCOll1eS in Ihe Uniled Slates: A Polilical-EconolllY Pllz.::Je, 16 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'y 104, 108
(2000) (noting that "some of the adjustment ... will occur via a change in the output mix, reducing the
costs to the competing factor (i.e. domestic unskilled labour)"); id. at 109 (arguing that "there is
some presumption that output-mix adjustment fully absorbs the immigrant shock").
42. See David Card, 111II1ligrall/ Inflows. Nmil'e OIl/}lo11's. alld [he Local Labor Markel Impacts
Higher 1l1l1l1iRralion, 19 J. LAB. Eco .22,28 (200J) (noting lhal "employers ... could have anticipated
some fraction of the relative supply shifts lhat actually occurred" in the local labor market as a result of
an influx of immigral1l workers, "leading to ... a lessening of impacts on the relative wage structure").

or
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have the opposite effects. Immigration restrictions may raise wages for some
workers, but these workers are likely to be other immigrants rather than natives.
Higher labor costs would cause those sectors employing those workers to shrink,
which in turn would cause some jobs that would otherwise go to natives to
disappear instead. If some of these sectors produce goods traded in international
markets, then higher labor costs could cause those jobs to go overseas, where the
relevant labor is more abundant and therefore less costly. Thus, the net result of
immigration restrictions may well be harmful for native workers.
Nevertheless, some economists claim that immigration has had a significant
adverse impact on the least skilled native workers. 43 It is important, however, to
interpret these claims carefully in light of the positive effects of immigration on the
demand for native labor. Recent work by BOljas, in particular, is widely cited by
restrictionists for his large estimates of the effect of immigrants on native wages.
In a study published in 2003, he divides workers into thirty-two classes based on
levels of education and experience, and then estimates that if immigration increases
the supply of a given class of labor by 10%, this hypothetical increase in supply
would cause a 3% to 4% fall in the wage for natives in that class of labor../4 One
cannot infer from this estimate, however, that the actual influx of immigrants into
the United States has such a negative effect, because in reality this stream of
immigrants includes workers from all thirty-two classes of labor, and many of these
workers may be complements rather than substitutes for nati ve workers in any
given class of labor. Even if a native worker suffers a loss from the entry of those
immigrant workers that are the closest substitutes for the native's own labor, the
entry of other immigrant workers may confer sufficient gains on that worker to
leave that native worker better off on balance.
Borjas attempts to estimate the actual effect of all immigration between 1980
and 2000 on native workers in the United States, concluding that the large influx of
workers over these two decades reduced the wage of the average native worker by
3.2% and the wage of high-school dropouts by 8.9% during this period. eli These
results, however, are based on a simulation that makes two extreme assumptions.
First, he assumes that immigrants are perfect substitutes for natives within each
class of labor. This assumption runs contrary to the weight of the empincal
evidence. Second, he assumes that the capital stock is fixed and does not respond
to this immigration by increasing the supply of capital to the economic activities
employing this expanded supply of labor:16 Given these unrealistic assumptions,
his simulation is inherently biased in favor of finding large adverse effects on
nati ve workers ..J7

_.. _-.. -

- - - _.. _ - - - -

43. See. e.g., BORJAS, supra note 12, at 99 (claiming that immigration "transfers a substantial
amount of wealth away from the workers who compete with immigrants to the natives who have skills
or physical resources that benefit from the presence of immigrants" and that "it is the less-skilled natives
who pay the price of immigration").
44. George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve is Dowllward Slopillg: Reexamining rhe Imfiocr of
Immigration all [he IL/lJor Markel, 118 Q.l ECON. 1335, 1344, 1347, 1349. 1356, 1359 (2003).
45. Id. at [368.
46. Id. C'[a'lssuming that the capital stock is constant").
47. [n a more recent simulation, George Borjas and Lawrence Katz allow the capital stock to adjust
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A marc recent study by Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri uses a
simulation that instead allows the supply of capital to adjust and allows immigrants
and natives within each class of labor to be imperfect substitutes. 48 By relaxing the
unrealistic assumptions used by BOIjas, they produce dramatically different results.
Once they allow the capital stock to adjust fully, they estimate that all immigration
into the United States from 1990 to 2004 increases the average wage of native
workers by 1.8% and decreases the wage of native high-school dropouts by only
1.1%.49 Indeed, they find that all native workers with at least a high-school
education enjoy increased wages as a result of this immigration rather than reduced
wages. 50 Thus, this influx of immigrants had an adverse effect only on the
shrinking minority of native workers with less than a high-school education,"1 and
this effect was quite smalp1
-_._--_.

----

and produce much hetter results for native workers. See GEORGE J. BORJAS & LAWRENCE F. KATZ. THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAI':-BORN WORKFORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (Nal'l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper. o. 11281,2005). After the capital market adjusts to the influx of immigrants
between 1980 and 2000. the wage of the average worker rises slightly. and the wages of high-school
dropouts falls by only 4.8%. Id. at 39-40, 63. Borjas and Katz have since reduced their estimate of this
adverse effect on the wages of high-school dropouts down to 3.6%, "acknowledging that the original
analysis used some statistically flimsy data." Eduardo Parler, COSI of I/Iegal IlI/l11i[iralion Mo.\' Be Less
Than Meets Ihe Eye. IY. TIMES. Apr. 16,2006, § 3, at 3. This "small impact ... was likely swamped
by all the other things that hit the economy." including "the revolution in technology." Id. Furthermore,
all of these simulations maintain the unrealistic assumplion that immigrants and natives are perfect
substitutes within each class of labor.
48. See GIA'MARCO J.P. On'AvIANO & GIOVA 'NI PERI, RETHI~KING THE EFFECTS OF
iMMIGRATION ON WAGES 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 12497,2(06).
49. ld. at 4.
50. Jd.
51. See BORJAS, supra note 22, at 27 (noting that "by 1998, only 9('/0 of natives lacked a high school
diploma" and showing how this percenlage declined steadily over the preceding four decades); NRC,
supra note 16, at 228 (noting that "[b Iy 1995, high school dropouts represented less than 10% of the
American workforce" and were "a declining group of American workers"). Borjas notes with concern
that '·the educational attainment and wages of immigrants" have increasingly fallen behind those of
nalive workers, who have steadily become more educated over the past four decades. BORJAS, supra
note 22, at 21. He complains thai unskilled immigrants "do nol perform well in the American labor
market" and that "there is lillie hope that they will reach economic parity with native workers during
their lifetimes." Id. at 38. Yet this increasing divergence between the skill levels of immigrants and
those of natives may be salutary rather than a cause for concern. As we do a better job of educating our
nativc workforce. unskilled immigrants are increasingly likely to be complements rather than substitutes
for natives in the labor market and thus likely to pose lillie threat to the wages of native workers.
52. A recelll study by Card also finds lhat "the measured effects of immigrant inflows on the native
wage structure are small." Card, slIpra note 42, at 57-58. Card concludes that "in the short run at least,"
immigrant inflows from 1985 to 1990 probably reduced wages and employment rates for less-skilled
native workers in "very high-immigrant cities like Los Angeles and Miami" by 3% at most. Id. at 57.
The effects in other cities with fewer new immigrants and the effects on natives in "other occupation
groups." however, "were probably much smaller" lei. "Even for workers in the bottom of the skill
distribution," he tinds "relatively modest employment effects of recent immigrant inflows in all but a
few high-immigrant cities," and ..the implied effects for natives as a whole are very smalL" Id. at 58.
Furthermore. his findings for the effects on the least-educated native workers are based on
"[i]nstrumental v,uiable estimates," which do not allow "industry structure" to adjust "product mixes
and capital stocks" in response to the influx of immigrant labor. Id. at 28; see id. at 50, 54. Allowing
employers to adjust rather than assuming "a fixed industry struclUre" would mitigate any adverse effects
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Indeed, the estimated effect on native workers with less than a high-school
education is so small, many of these workers may well enjoy net gains rather than
suffer net losses as a result of this immigration. Applying a similar approach to
California data, Peri estimates that immigration yielded even larger benefits for
native workers in California, where almost 30% of all immigrant workers lived in
2004. 53 Under the "most plausible" assumptions, Peri estimates that immigration
from 1999-2004 increased the average wage of native workers in California by
4.1 % and even incrensed wages for native workers with less than a high-school
education in California by 0.2%.54
HI. PROTECTIONISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
We may want to prevent even a small reduction in the wages of our least
skilled workers, and protectionists may defend immigration restrictions on this
basis. Like trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacrifice gains from trade
and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as a group. In this sense, protectionism
is a costly way to redistribute wealth from some natives to others. We could
redistribute the same wealth through tax policies and transfer programs rather than
through protectionism and probably would thereby make all classes of natives
better off than they ,lre under restrictive immigration poJicies, because immigration
produces net gains for natives as a group.55
If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from adverse changes in the
distribution of income, then progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies are
likely to prove less costly than protectionist immigration restrictions. As long as
immigration increases total wealth, then those who gain from immigration can
compensate those who lose and still be better off. Redistribution can shift the costs
of liberalized immigration policies to the beneficiaries of liberalization.
Protectionist policies currently impose an implicit tax on natives that probably costs
them more than the explicit tax that would be necessary to compensate unski lied
native workers for the effects of liberalized immigration policies. Once we
recognize that protectionism is merely a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it
should be apparent that there is no good reason to favor protectionism over less
costly and more efficient transfer policies.
We could probably achieve redistribution more efficiently and equitably by
expanding programs already in place in our tax system. Given the small adverse
effects of immigration and the small number of native workers who find their
wages reduced by the influx of immigrant labor, a fairly small increase in the
progressivity of our tax rates would suffice to compensate the few who lose income
as a result of competition from immigrant workers. We could make Social Security
taxes more progressi ve, for example, or we could increase the earned income tax
credit and liberalize its requirements.

on native workers. Id. at 28.

53. See GIOVA, NI PERI, ItvI~IIGRANTS' COMPLEMENTARITIES AI I) ATIVE WAGES: EVIUENCE
at'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. [1956,2006).
54. Id. at 18-19.
55. See Chang. supra note 31, 309-11.
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These measures would not seek to compensate precisely every single
individual adversely affected by liberalized immigration. To insist that reforms
make ]iterally no one worse off is to set too high a hurdle for reform. Such a
requirement would prevent us from implementing virtually any reform in any
public policy.
Not only is it infeasible as a practical matter to replicate exactly the
distribution produced by protectionism, it is also not desirable as a normative
matter that we do so. We can design progressive tax and transfer policies so that
they distribute income on the basis of morally relevant criteria, whereas the
alternative of protectionism distributes its subsidy on a morally arbitrary basis.
Protectionism subsidizes the unskilled native who happens to face immigrant
competition in the labor market but not the similarly unskilled native who does not.
In this sense, protectionism is inferior to tax and transfer policies from the
perspective of not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice.
Furthermore, this discussion of distributive justice among natives has ignored
the benefits that the immigrants themselves enjoy from their access to our labor
markets and the benefits that flow to people overseas in the form of remittances.
This discussion has assumed that the welfare of immigrants and of people overseas
is of no concern to us. Once we give any weight at all to the interests of those born
outside our borders, however, then we have yet another reason to liberalize
immigration. Once we recognize any moral obligation to reduce povel1y abroad
and to reduce global inequality, we must confront the significant economic harm
we inflict on the aliens that we exclude under our restrictive immigration laws.
Given the adverse effects of restrictive immigration policies on the poor abroad,
considerations of global justice militate in favor of progressive fiscal policies and
against protectionism as a method of addressing any concerns regarding the
distribution of income among natives.

